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WHY SHOULD WE CARE HOW
JUDGES VIEW CIVIL JURIES?
Nancy J. King*

At a bar function earlier this year, the dinner table conversation
turned to juries. One judge1 spoke freely against allowing jurors to
submit questions for witnesses to the judge during the trial. "Makes
them think they are in control," he said, "and that's dangerous."
"What is the danger, exactly?" I could not help asking. "Gives them
too much power," he explained. "They begin to demand things: pizza,
breaks, certain evidence. They could begin to think that they can apply whatever law they want in deliberations. It can interfere with the
litigants' interest in the orderly presentation of their cases. Judges run
trials, not jurors."
I wondered how another trial judge I knew would respond to that
opinion. The jurist I had in mind was downright reverential about his
jurors. As far as he was concerned, they were the justice system's
most honored guests, to be treated like V.I.Ps. In court he reprimanded any attorney who dared to inconvenience or show disrespect
for the jurors by keeping them waiting or by failing to rise when they
entered the courtroom. This judge answered jurors' questions and
bent over backwards to meet their requests, addressing jurors in tones
reserved for decorated war veterans who have risked their lives for
the greater good. I suspect that this judge never worried that such
adulation would have a negative effect on his or the parties' control of
the litigation.
A third view of jurors was represented in yet another judge's comments to me. He told me that jurors try hard, but just do not have the
expertise or judgment needed to decide complex factual inquiries. He
tries to make the questions they decide as simple and easy as possible.
"So they don't feel bad," he explained.
Why is one judge threatened and wary of the jury, another grateful
and full of admiration, and another patronizing and condescending?
Paula Hannaford, Michael Dann, and Thomas Munsterman offer sev* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University School of Law.
1. I have chosen not to provide identifying information about my judicial sources.
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eral reasons to explain these varying judicial attitudes2 toward jurors
in their article How Judges View Civil Juries.3 In my brief comments, I
would like to explore a question somewhat different, although related,
to the issues addressed so well by Hannaford, Dann, and Munsterman.
The question in which I am interested actually precedes theirs: Why
do we even care about judicial attitudes towards jurors? Put somewhat differently: How could we use this information?
Judicial attitudes toward jurors are important to understand for two
reasons. First, judicial attitudes have a direct influence on jurors in
the courtroom. I disagree with the authors' initial assertion that judicial views of the jury "ultimately have little effect on the actual performance of civil juries ' 4 though I have little more proof of my
position than they have for theirs. But consider: What a judge expects
from jurors cannot help but influence what she says and does during a
trial, and this, in turn, must affect, at least to some degree, the juror's
own views about his role and about his fellow jurors.5 For example, a
judge's perception of jurors' ability to process information and assess
its relevance will affect her rulings on evidence and her instructions to
the jury, as well as her rulings during voir dire. A judge who distrusts
jurors may second-guess jurors' answers during voir dire, exclude evidence, or give cautionary instructions and warnings during the trial.
She may be quicker to find misconduct by jurors. A judge who thinks
that her duty is to simplify the jurors' job into something they can
handle is less likely to solicit, or even answer, questions from the jury.
A judge who reveres the jury may discount signs that a jury is having
real trouble understanding what is going on, unable to consider that
the jury may be only a "collection of lay persons who have little or no
accurate knowledge of the American justice system and who are fully
capable of fallibility."' 6 In other words, had the three judges mentioned earlier sat on the same case tried to the same jury, I suspect
that the jurors in the three trials would come away with different sets
of information about the subject of the trial, as well as different views
about their own role as jurors and the jury system as a whole.
2. The triad of attitudes illustrated here by no means exhausts the variety of judicial views
toward jurors.
3. Paula L. Hannaford et al., How Judges View Civil Juries, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 247 (1999).
4. Paula L. Hannaford et al., How Judges View Civil Juries (draft Mar. 1998, at 12) (on file
with the DePaul Law Review).
5. Peter D. Blanck, What EmpiricalResearch Tells Us: Studying Judges' and Juries' Behavior,
40 AM. U. L. REV. 775 (1991). "The courts, legal scholars, practitioners, and social scientists
recognize that trial judges' verbal and nonverbal behavior may have important effects on trial
processes and outcomes .
i..."
Id. at 777. Blanck's article also contains a collection of sources
studying the effects of judicial behavior on trials. Id.
6. Hannaford et al., supra note 3, at 256.
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Conceivably, it could be possible to identify which judicial attitudes
prompt the most efficient, accurate, and satisfying decision making by
jurors, or, at the least, which judicial attitudes about jurors seem to
consistently correlate with certain negative aspects of the deliberative
process. 7 Thus identified, this information could become an element
of judicial training and evaluation programs. Undoubtedly, some will
guffaw at the prospect of changing the minds of judges about anything as fundamental as the treatment of jurors. For skeptics, there
may be another use for this information that does not involve attitude
adjustment. Awareness of correlations between judicial attitude and
jury performance could be used to help interpret information about
jury behavior in courtrooms or districts in which a certain judicial attitude is prevalent.
Attention to judicial attitudes about juries may have a second, more
direct value to those considering jury reforms. Just as judicial views
about the capabilities and shortcomings of juries control to some extent the administration of trial procedures, they also control changes
in those procedures as well. 8 Jury reform truly starts and ends with
judges, as it is judges who must eventually administer any jury procedure. For good or ill, judges constitute jury reform's major constituency. Through their writings and lobbying, or simply by failing to
implement changes, judges can control the jury reform agenda. If a
majority of judges in a particular jurisdiction does not view a particular jury procedure or condition as a problem, those who wish to
change it will have an uphill battle. This suggests that information
regarding judicial attitudes about jurors may prove to be a better diagnostic tool than public opinion surveys when it comes to jury reform
because information about judicial attitudes can help lawmakers and
others decide when reform efforts should be directed elsewhere or
postponed. 9 For example, of the over 550 trial judges who responded
to a recent survey concerning juror misconduct in cases tried over the
past three years, 27% reported that not a single juror had failed to tell

7. Of course, it would be much more difficult to sort out these effects in real trials than in
mock trial studies. Cf. Peter David Blanck et al., The Measure of the Judge: An EmpiricallyBased Frameworkfor Exploring Trial Judges' Behavior, 75 IowA L. REV. 653 (1990) (describing
an empirically-based framework for exploring trial judges' behavior in actual trials and reporting
the results).
8. See Hannaford et al., supra note 3, at 257 (mentioning that judicial views are affected by
jury reform efforts). I think the link is much stronger in the other direction, a point they eventually make later in their article. Id. at 259-60.
9. This is not to suggest that judicial opinion will never coincide with public opinion on these
matters, just that judicial opinion has greater influence.
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the truth, while 2% reported that jurors were untruthful in most or
even all trials. 10
The authors' analysis of judicial attitudes toward juries is a useful
tool for advocates of jury reform for another reason. Sensitivity to the
features that shape judicial attitudes about jurors may facilitate more
productive discussion and negotiations about various reform proposals. Often, a judge's self interest in opposing or endorsing change may
very well coincide with the public's interest. For example, both may
be interested in minimizing the cost of litigation. But sometimes the
individual incentives of judges will depart from the preferences of the
public or the legislature. Using the same reasoning that the authors
employed to trace the source of judicial attitudes about juries, one can
assume, for instance, that a judge's capacity to recognize a "problem"
with her juries is influenced by self interest, at least subconsciously.
So long as the public and others link jury behavior to judicial action
(as I have above, and the public did after the trial of O.J. Simpson),
trial judges will continue to be blamed for jury shortcomings. Judges
may very well react to the assessment that "juries are failing," as parents react to claims that their children have gone awry-defensively.
To avoid unpleasant self-doubt and guilt ("It's our fault-where did
we go wrong?"), whether irrational or not, it may be easier for judges
to deny that any problem exists.' 2 Similarly, even judges who may
agree that a particular change in jury procedure is needed may resist it
for reasons that vary in their legitimacy, including laziness, reluctance
to take on new responsibly, or the desire to minimize accountability.
This possibility suggests that the most productive discussions about
jury reform will take place when these competing incentives are recognized and addressed. By collecting and exposing these influences,
the authors have opened the dialogue. In the years to come, we
should remind ourselves of their insights.
10. Nancy J. King, Juror Delinquency in Criminal Trials in America, 1796-1996, 94 MICH. L.
REv. 2673, 2737 (1996).
11. See, e.g., Murray Richtel, The Simpson Trial: A Timid Judge and a Lawless Verdict, 67 U.
COLO. L. REv. 977 (1996).
I am loathe to criticize jury verdicts because I think that if the jury goes wrong, it is
usually the judge who bears a measure of responsibility ....
My distance from the
Simpson case, however, gives me the luxury of saying that .... Judge Ito's handling of
the case greatly contributed to a courtroom atmosphere that was not conducive to justice, and his conduct in part explains the jury verdict.
Id. at 979-80.
12. See Hannaford et al., supra note 3, at 256 (stating that judges may view the jury trial itself
as proof of failed settlement or case management skills). The tendency for judges, like the rest
of us, to cast our behavior in the best light possible may lead judges to subconsciously underreport jury misconduct or fail to recognize it, for example.

